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The diary of an undercover agent in Mexico’s war on drugs1 
 
Diario de un agente encubierto [Diary of an undercover agent], by Tomás Borges, Mexico 
City, Temas de Hoy, 2013, 342pp., £20 (paperback), ISBN 9786070718519 
 
How do Mexican intelligence agents operate in the context of the Mexican war on drugs 
(guerra contra el narcotráfico en México)?2 Under the pseudonym Tomás Borges, the author 
of this book attempts to respond to this question through his memoir of 15 years of professional 
activity as an intelligence agent. This chronicle tries to demystify the internal dynamics of 
intelligence agencies and the most recurrent practices of those responsible for Mexican national 
security during the period from 1997 to 2008. Borges’ background has allowed him to 
specialise in analysing the symbiotic relationship that exists between members of the security 
community and criminal organizations.3 This is well-illustrated in his works Maquiavelo para 
narcos (Machiavelli for narcs)4 and Arte de la guerra para narcos (Art of war for narcs),5 
where he demonstrates a comprehensive analytical focus, moving from realist and traditional 
postures, toward the reflexive and critical approaches demonstrated in Diario de un agente 
encubierto. In the Diario de un agente encubierto, Borges makes use of narrative to relate 
illustrative anecdotes derived from his professional experience in areas of tactical and operative 
analysis during the so-called drugs war (also known as the Mexican war on drugs). Borges’ 
book is important, not least because of the magnitude of Mexico’s place in the international 
trade in narcotics. Indeed, the journalist Roberto Saviano recently examined the global trade in 
cocaine through a study of Mexico. Signally, Saviano asserted that 
 
Mexico is the origin of everything [and if] you disregard Mexico, you’ll never 
understand the destiny of democracies transformed by drug traffic. If you disregard 
Mexico, you’ll never find the route that follows the smell of money, you won’t 
realize how the odor of criminal money becomes a winning smell that has very little 
to do with the stench of death, poverty, barbarity, and corruption.6 
 
In Diario de un agente encubierto Borges describes, and reflects on, the tensions arising 
from operational errors and efforts to professionalise the Mexican intelligence services. These 
were exacerbated by the fact Borges’ narrative coincides with an era in which the issues of 
national security and intelligence were accorded a low priority on the political agenda. Borges 
was confirmed in many of his opinions when, thanks to his social network forged in the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) and in the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 
UNAM), he was seconded to the Centre for Investigation and National Security (Centro de 
Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, CISEN) in 1997. Early in his time in the CISEN, Borges 
recalls the very real pressure applied by the United States’ government following the 1998 
terrorist attacks on their embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Borges’ assignment to counter-
terrorism duties gave him up-close and personal experience of liaison with the US Department 
                                                          
1 Published online in the Journal Intelligence and National Security in November 2017. 
2 According to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports, Mexico is a major drug producing and transit 
country. Is proximity to the United States means that it is the main foreign supplier of cannabis, a crucial entry 
point for Latin American cocaine and Asian methamphetamines to the vast North American market. On this, see 
Ed Vulliamy, Amexica: War Along the Borderline (London: Bodley Head, 2010). 
3 On the rise of drug-related crime in Mexico, see Grillo, El Narco; and Hernández, Narcoland. 
4 Borges, Maquiavelo para narcos. 
5 Borges, Arte de la guerra para narcos. 
6 Saviano, ZeroZeroZero, 37. For an insightful review of Saviano’s book, see House, Review of ZeroZeroZero, 
531–4. 
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of State - and assorted Latin American intelligence agencies - as the Mexican state sought to 
professionalize its anti-terrorist capabilities. Mexican personnel did this in partnership with 
their American counterparts at the burgeoning US Counter Terrorism Intelligence Centre 
(CTIC).7 Despite this, the Mexican government’s priorities lay not in tracing and targeting 
radical groups from the Middle East or East Africa. Instead, the main effort of Mexican 
counter-terrorism was directed towards the capture of the leaders of the Revolutionary Army 
of the Insurgent People (ERPI) as well as Mexican-based members of the Basque separatist 
terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). 
 
The defeat of the PRI in the presidential election in 2000 – after 71 years in power – 
would imply the turn of the century encompassed an era of political transition in Mexico. 
(Although not necessarily for the good). Borges argues that the subsequent accession to power 
of the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) ruined the progress made on 
security issues during the 1990s. This was primarily down to two factors. First, the new 
administration dismantled key parts of the intelligence services (which they accused of having 
been used for the purpose of political espionage). This caused deep fissures within the federal 
public administration (witness, for example, the power struggle between senior officials of the 
Federal Preventive Police (Policia Federal Preventiva, PFP) and the newly-created Public 
Security Secretariat (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, SSP)). Second, the security cabinet, 
charged with directing the budgets, priorities and resource allocation of the intelligence 
agencies were inefficient and ineffective. Because of such failings, the terrorist attacks of 11 
September on the US were not entirely unwelcome to some Mexican intelligence officers 
because they demonstrated the reality of the threat from terrorism – which some members of 
the new government had seemed to believe had been largely imaginary. 
 
At the structural level, the PAN administrations did pass a national security law, 
regulated intelligence activities, and strengthened the intelligence capabilities of federal police 
forces. However, many of the proposed reforms generated unnecessary bureaucratic friction at 
the operational level. This is exemplified by the integration process of the PFP and the Federal 
Investigation Agency (Agencia Federal de Investigación, AFI) to the SSP in the framework of 
the notorious ‘Mexico Safe’ strategy. In this context, Borges relates how his assignments 
included being charged to capture a leader of Los Zetas8 – and to take charge of the former 
leader of the Gulf Cartel in a maximum-security prison. This episode granted Borges a sobering 
insight into the power that certain criminals wield in Mexico – power seemingly hardly 
diminished even when they are prison inmates. For Borges, the generic problems in Mexican 
intelligence remained despite his years of well-directed effort and bureaucratic in-fighting. His 
last assignments to the International Airport of Mexico City (Aeropuerto Internacional de la 
Ciudad de México, AICM) and to the Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la 
República, PGR) made it evident to Borges that inefficiency and corruption remained inherent 
in the security institutions in Mexico. To illustrate this, the author vividly recounts the modus 
operandi of the network that worked with the personnel and resources of the Presidential 
                                                          
7 The CTIC was set up after 9/11 as a joint venture between the CIA and a number of foreign intelligence services 
as part of the US ‘War on Terror’. Four years later, one former CIA counterterrorism expert stated that ‘[t]he vast 
majority of [recent counterterrorism] successes [have] involved our CTICs’. And, in the majority of successful 
operations, ‘[t]he boot that went through the door was foreign.’ Another former CIA operative commented that 
‘CTICs were a step forward in codifying, organizing liaison relationships that elsewhere would be more ad hoc’. 
Dana Priest, “Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fight: Joint Facilities in Two Dozen Countries Account 
for Bulk of Agency’s Post-9/11 Successes.” Washington Post, November 18, 2005. 
8 In 2009 the journalist Ed Vulliamy reported that ’the Zetas, originally established as an enforcement wing of the 
narco-trafficking Gulf Cartel, but now a paramilitary militia in its own right, highly trained in combat and probably 
the most powerful drug-trafficking organisation in the world.’ Ed Vulliamy, “The Zetas.” 
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General Staff (Estado Mayor Presidencial, EMP), PGR, AFI, and PFP on behalf of criminal 
organisations. 
 
Borges does not write to his audience from the academic domain and forgoes references 
to theoretical postulates or abstract concepts to support his arguments. He relates his story from 
a practical perspective, describing his day-to-day work as an intelligence agent. When 
portraying each of his activities at the heart of Mexican intelligence, Borges attempts to go 
beyond common assumptions and stereotypes. The common references to the ‘intelligence 
services’ in Mexico, widely perceived as the corrupt perpetrators of the so-called ‘dirty war’, 
political persecution, the repression of dissent, and personal revenge, have all been sustained 
in a climate of myth and suspicion. Therefore, much of the significance of Borges’ work lies 
in his debunking of many of these half-truths and myths that prevail in the public discourses 
about these organisations. Through this careful process of demystification, the central theme 
of the work emerges: namely, the identification of the grey zone between criminals and law 
enforcement agencies in Mexico whose exposure says a great deal about the way those 
networks, on both sides of the divide, operate. 
 
As a primary source, this work is very valuable, not only for its narrative and historical 
framework but also for the detail of the descriptions that Borges gives about aspects of the 
Mexican intelligence and national security which would otherwise be hidden from public view. 
For example, concerning recruitment, Borges reveals the characteristics of the evaluation and 
selection process, especially about the admission profile and on the examinations that the 
candidates are required to pass to enter CISEN. Also, with respect to training, Borges exposes 
part of the theoretical knowledge required, and the practical exercises utilized, in the courses 
taught by CISEN and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel. Borges also 
outlines the main elements of the doctrinal corpus, the hi-tech devices employed, as well as the 
procedures that governed his daily activities. Indeed, the accuracy of the data that he shares 
regarding operating protocols, criminal profiles, press reports, informal conversations, 
communication codes, and investigations files all strengthen Borges’ book considerably. These 
elements make this work a relevant source of consultation for students and researchers of 
intelligence and national security in the contemporary context. 
 
Diario de un agente encubierto is far from being a superficial narrative and represents 
rather more than a simple chronicle of events in the life of an intelligence agent. Borges 
frequently elaborates on his narrative in expansive fashion, and he reflects thoughtfully on what 
he has lived, witnessed and regretted. He is to be commended for the fact he is unafraid to 
criticise certain of his own decisions in an honest and disarming fashion. One would think that 
an agent of intelligence, a figure usually portrayed as one indoctrinated by the state, would 
never make critical judgments towards his institutions and his chiefs. Borges does so, without 
losing respect for people or falling into crude and vulgar reproaches. His capacity for self-
reflection contributes to the real value of this text. Borges’ memoir represents an impressive 
indictment of the damage that is wrought by corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, 
incompetence, voluntarism, irresponsibility, errors, and the unreasonable attitude of too many 
of those responsible for the national security of Mexico. But his judgements are not simply 
negative. Borges also offers several possible solutions to clearly-identified problems, and even 
more importantly, he recognizes the efforts of colleagues and superiors who have risked their 
careers and their lives in the line of duty. 
 
Given the nature of Borges’ text, it is hard to make comparisons with other works. This 
is because this diary is unique, and to date, there is no other similar work that tackles the topic 
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of Mexican intelligence from the inside, and with such an experiential approach. Perhaps the 
closest text is La Charola (The Plate) by Sergio Aguayo Quezada. La Charola’s9 documentary 
research addresses the origins and evolution of intelligence services in Mexico from an external 
perspective – but with a rigorous and critical academic analysis. It is worth mentioning that the 
topic of intelligence in Mexico has been scarcely discussed by politicians, intelligence 
professionals, and society in general. In this context, it is thus possible to affirm that the 
relevance of Borges’ publication lies not just in the uniqueness of his narrative, but in his 
challenge to open the ‘Pandora’s box’ of Mexican intelligence. Borges’ book is most welcome 
in the wake of decades of struggle against drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico 
(where intelligence services have played a crucial role, albeit on both sides of the law). 
 
Borges’ book represents a remarkable contribution to the study of intelligence and 
national security in Mexico. Rather than subjecting its content to the superficial explanation of 
the objective structures that govern contemporary Mexican intelligence, the author allows his 
readers to witness the reality of the day-to-day functioning of these institutions. Throughout 
the text, the reader will understand elements of the processes that have led to the manipulation 
and distortion of the national security of the Mexican state. The sustained quality of Borges’ 
memoir means that it deserves to be read by more than just specialists of Mexican national 
security. In short, Diario de un agente encubierto should be required reading for all scholars 
and practitioners of contemporary intelligence. 
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